Sometimes, governments suppress religion by persecuting believers.
Other times, governments suppress religion by defining it as non-religion.
Consider the case of Colette McCadd, an employee of Kraft Heinz. McCadd sought a religious exemption from the Covid vaccine requirement, but the company denied her exemption and an Obama-appointed federal judge agreed with the company.
As Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman wrote in her opinion, McCadd believes her “body is a temple of God and the Holy Spirit,” that she must “ask God about anything regarding [her] body and going into [her] bloodstream,” and that she was “told through God and the Holy Spirit in [her] prayer time that the COVID vaccine would defile [her] body.” She believes God told her that the “flu vaccine, illegal drugs, and cigarettes would defile her body,” but that “alcohol, food, and caffeine do not defile her body and she is not required to consult with God as to whether she can [sic] ingest these substances.”
The judge ruled that McCadd’s beliefs were personal and medical rather than religious, noting that McCadd cited no specific religious tenet of her Christian faith that prohibited the vaccine, but instead relied on “broad principles that her ‘body is a temple’” (failing to note that the phrase comes from I Corinthians 6:19). The judge also said McCadd’s “inconsistencies of when she is required to consult with God when ingesting a substance” are “further evidence that Plaintiff’s beliefs are not ‘religious’, but secular.” She therefore ruled that McCadd was not entitled to a religious exemption. McCadd has appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and the Foundation for Moral Law is preparing an amicus brief on her behalf.
The judge totally ignored two very important Supreme Court cases in her decision. In United States v. Ballard (1944), the Court considered the case of a man convicted of mail fraud for claiming to be in communication with angels. As Justice Douglas wrote:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mere mortals does not mean they can be made suspect before the law.
The Court more fully articulated this doctrine in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1981). Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, was fired from a steel foundry for refusing to work on tank turrets. Jehovah’s Witnesses generally object to war and military service, but have no official doctrine prohibiting work on tank turrets; thus the lower court ruled that his objection was personal and philosophical rather than religious. The lower court found it inconsistent that Thomas would not work on tank turrets but would work in a foundry that produced steel for war materials. But as Chief Justice Burger wrote for the High Court:
In reaching its conclusion, the Indiana court seems to have placed considerable reliance on the facts that Thomas was ‘struggling’ with his beliefs and that he was not able to ‘articulate’ his belief precisely. It noted, for example, that Thomas admitted before the referee that he would not object to
‘working for United States Steel or Inland Steel . . . [producing] the raw product necessary for the production of any kind of tank . . . [because I] would not be a direct party to whoever they shipped it to [and] would not be . . . chargeable in . . . conscience. . . .’ …
The court found this position inconsistent with Thomas' stated opposition to participation in the production of armaments. But Thomas' statements reveal no more than that he found work in the roll foundry sufficiently insulated from producing weapons of war. We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.
The lower court also noted that another Jehovah’s Witness testified that he had no problem working on tank turrets. But as the Court observed:
Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
Just because McCadd’s beliefs are “incomprehensible” to Coleman doesn’t mean they lack First Amendment protection. Just because the “line” she drew between various substances seemed “unreasonable” to this judge doesn’t mean they are nonreligious. Just because her “beliefs [were] not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person [i.e. Coleman] might employ,” does not mean the court may dismiss them.
In the Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason described religion as “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.” Clearly, McCadd believes she owes a duty to her Creator to consult Him about ingesting certain substances into her body and His directive, regardless of the manner in which she believes He revealed it to her. What could be more consistent with Mason’s definition of religion than that?
I hope the Seventh Circuit reverses this ill-begotten decision.
Colonel Eidsmoe serves as Professor of Constitutional Law for the Oak Brook College of Law & Government Policy (obcl.edu), as Senior Counsel for the Foundation for Moral Law (morallaw.org), and as Pastor of Woodland Presbyterian Church of Notasulga, Alabama (woodlandpca.org). He may be contacted for speaking engagements at [email protected].
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of 1819 News. To comment, please send an email with your name and contact information to [email protected].
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